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This Briefing will set out the current state of the Brexit negotiations in the field of air transport. 
The Briefing will show that, in addition to specific issues that arise in the field of air transport, such 
as which rights of access are to be granted or differences in the understanding of ‘ownership and 
control’ or ‘fair competition’, the issues that have more generally caused difficulties for both sides 
in the negotiations can also be found in the air transport area. These general stumbling blocks 
include the Union’s ‘level playing field provisions’ and different approaches to dispute resolution. 
While the air transport specific issues can perhaps be bridged, the more general issues will require 
major concessions to avoid the damaging prospect of each party being denied access to the air 
space of the other.  
 
Introduction 
The United Kingdom left the European Union on 31 January 2020 and is currently bound by, and 
benefits from, EU law as part of the Withdrawal Agreement it concluded with the EU. This also 
includes provisions on aviation, which allow the UK to benefit from continuous access to the 
European Union. The transition period ends on 31 December 2020 and both sides will need to 
conclude an agreement in some form to continue accessing each other’s aviation space. While the 
current negotiations on an agreement about the Future Relationship include provisions on aviation, 
the negotiation positions, as they are publicly known, are still some way apart and, more generally, 
there is the possibility that no agreement will be found by the end of the year.  
This Briefing will set out the position under the transitional arrangements of the Withdrawal 
Agreement before proceeding to a discussion of the differences in the positions of the EU and the 
UK in the current negotiations. It will set out some thoughts as to how those differences could be 
bridged and conclude with some reflections on what will happen in case no agreement is struck. 
 
Background 
When the UK left the European Union on 31 January 2020 not much changed form a legal 
perspective, as, by and large, EU law continued to apply by virtue of the Withdrawal Agreement. This 
was also the case in the area of air transport, where the EU over time has developed a truly common 
aviation space. The UK enjoyed the same level of access to the EU-27 and vice-versa as before the 
exit date. With the end of the transition period approaching, the position can change dramatically at 
the end of 2020. If no arrangement is found, then, at least as a matter of principle, planes from the 
UK will not be allowed to fly over or land in the EU-27 and vice-versa. So where are we in the 
negotiations and what are the key remaining differences? 
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When considering the negotiations positions, at least those that were made publicly available, one 
can discern a number of key differences. 
 
Aviation as separate agreement or part of an overall agreement? 
The first difference is that the EU version of the draft agreement is one single document, in which 
the rules on air transport can be found in chapter one (air transport) of Title XII (Transport). On the 
other hand, the UK approach was set out in the provisions on air transport separately, but alongside 
the main trade agreement in a ‘Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement’. The key difference in 
approach has been that the EU agreement would have to be accepted as a whole, while the UK 
approached envisaged that an air transport agreement could be adopted even if the negotiations 
about the main trade agreement failed. 
 
Which ‘freedoms of the air’ are offered? 
The second difference exists in respect of the main substantive provisions of the agreement: the air 
transport freedoms that are offered. Currently the EU offers a common aviation area without any 
limitations. This includes all nine ‘freedoms of the air’. The ambitions of both parties in the current 
negotiations are much more limited, but still differ. The EU seems to offer merely the first four 
‘freedoms of the air’, including (1) the right to fly over a foreign country; (2) the right to refuel or 
carry out maintenance in a foreign country without embarking or disembarking passengers or cargo; 
(3) the right to fly from the home country and land in a foreign country; and (4) the right to fly from 
a foreign country and to land in the home country. In contrast the UK position offers those four 
rights but also the fifth ‘freedom’: that is, (5) to fly from the home country to a foreign country while 
stopping in another foreign country on the way. 
 
Ownership and control 
Another key substantive difference is the definition of ‘ownership and control’. This is a key concept 
that determines who is entitled to enjoy the rights set out in the agreement. The UK position is quite 
generous by merely requiring for an airline designated by the UK that the principal place of business 
of the airline is in the UK, that it is licenced in the UK and that the UK has effective regulatory 
control.  
On the other hand, the EU uses a more traditional and much narrower definition by requiring, in 
addition to the requirements set out by the UK, also that the air carrier should be owned, directly or 
through majority ownership, and effectively controlled by the EU-27 (or the UK), its nationals or 
both. The issue of ownership is of crucial importance for the UK, as at this point it is unclear which of 
its air carriers, if any, would meet the requirement set out in the Union’s draft. It is, however, 
important to note that the EU draft leaves open the possibility for a progressive liberalisation of the 
ownership and control rules. 
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Differences also emerge in the understanding of fair competition. While both sides agree on ‘fair 
competition’, the understanding of the term is different. The UK’s concept of fair competition is 
more loosely framed than that of the EU, in particular when it comes to defining anti-competitive 
conduct or prohibitions on state aid. While the EU has included its own well-established rules into its 
draft agreement, by replicating Treaty articles on competition rules and rules from the Merger 
Regulation, the UK uses more vaguely phrased terms. A similar intention, though less clear so far, of 
setting out precise rules can be suspected to govern the EU’s position on state aid. In contrast, the 
UK state aid approach is more loosely phrased with a considerable number of exceptions. 
 
Dispute resolution 
Finally, the preferred mechanisms for resolving disputes also differs significantly between the 
parties. On the UK side, there is a clear preference for dispute resolution and arbitration. If a dispute 
cannot be resolved within the proposed Aviation Committee, the parties are entitled to request the 
matter be resolved by binding arbitration. On the EU side, a more complex arrangement is 
envisaged. The air transport provisions also provide for a dispute resolution mechanism but at the 
same time leave the powers of competition authorities and courts intact. All the same, the dispute 
resolution mechanism envisaged by the Union in Title II of Part Five differs from that of the UK. 
While the EU mechanism also provides for arbitration, the EU provisions insist that where a dispute 
raises a question of interpretation or application of a concept of Union law contained in or referred 
to in the draft agreement, the arbitration tribunal is required to request the Court of Justice of the 
European Union to give a ruling, which is binding on the arbitration tribunal. 
 
Way ahead in the negotiations 
The differences between the two sides concerning the ‘freedoms of the air’, on ‘ownership and 
control’ and, perhaps, even those on ‘fair competition’ are not too big to be unresolvable. But it is 
the EU’s more general level playing field provisions and dispute resolution mechanism, with its 
compulsory involvement of the Court of Justice, that might ultimately prove to be too difficult to 
square with the UK’s position.  
 
Conclusion 
The gaps in the negotiating positions make a no-deal scenario likely. For aviation this would be a 
damaging prospect as without an agreement planes are not allowed to access each other’s airspace. 
In this case two options can be envisaged. The first option would see both parties agree a deal that is 
limited to air transport. This presupposes, of course, that the difficulties set out above can be 
overcome. But this cannot happen without either side making major concessions. The second option 
would see both parties adopt unilateral acts that grant the other side access to its airspace. We have 
already an example of what such unilateral action could look like on the EU side, and we can see that 
the access granted will be limited in time and on less generous grounds than foreseen in the EU draft 
agreement. Moreover, it is based on the UK reciprocating the arrangement.  
